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Abstract 
 
 
Japan‟s new bar examination has been administered since 2006. This paper 
attempts to analyze how professors selected as members of the committee (The Justice 
Ministry's committee of the new national bar examination) influence the results of the 
examination. I use a panel data set to control for unobservable characteristics of 
universities when the numbers of successful candidate are examined. The major 
findings are: (1) From 2006 to 2007, number of professors on the committee affected 
the number of successful candidates. Furthermore, committee members specializing in 
compulsory common subjects had a significant effect but those specializing in a 
selective subject had no effect. (2) From 2008 to 2009, neither type of committee 
member influenced the number of successful candidates. The unexpected outcomes in 
2006 and 2007 are considered to be the result of shortcomings in the new bar 
examination. This is in line with concept that high-powered incentive schemes are 
likely to induce behavior distortions (Jacob and Levitt, 2003). In 2008 and 2009, it is 
thought that social pressure against such unexpected behavior deterred such unfair 
behavior. 
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1. Introduction. 
    
One response to Japan‟s new bar examination, which was part of legal reforms 
planned to commence in 2006, was that new law schools began operation from April 
2004. The reforms aimed to overcome Japan‟s strict and rather extraordinarily 
competitive bar examination by transplanting aspects of the US law school model. This 
effective deregulation of the lawyer market was anticipated have benefits through an 
increased supply of lawyers (Kinoshita 2000, 2002), and to resolve problems arising 
from the former examination that required a particular set of skills and specific 
techniques (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 2004). 
Consequently, 68 new law schools commenced operation in 2004 with another 6 
opening in 2005. This dramatic increase in the number of new law schools actually 
resulted in the new bar examination becoming far more competitive than it was 
predicted to be; mainly because of the larger number of new entrants than expected. 
This competitive pressure seems to have induced the new law schools to focus on the 
skills and techniques emphasized in the old bar examination; whereas the intention of 
the reforms was for the new law schools to focus on legal qualification through a 
„process‟ of legal education, rather than focus at the „point‟ of the bar examination 
(Asahi Newspaper 2007d, Tamura 2007).  
The Ministry of Justice appointed members of the Justice Ministry's 
committee of the new national bar examination (hereafter, JMCNE) that would be 
responsible for setting and grading the examination. Total number of JMCNE 
members was approximately 120 1 . These members were selected from public 
prosecutors, attorneys, and university professors2, including those lecturing at the new 
law schools (Ministry of Justice 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008). This meant that a professor 
at a new law school who was also a JMCNE member could legitimately obtain copies of 
the examination prior to the examination date. In 2007, under the considerable 
competitive pressures that the new law schools faced, a JMCNE member who was also 
a professor at Keio University Law School3, informed his students of the contents of 
                                                   
1 Only in 2006, this number was 82. 
2 Not only professors but also associate professors and lecturers are able to lecture in 
Japanese law schools. For the sake of simplicity, I call all such lecturers „professor‟ in 
this paper. 
3 Keio University is regarded as a prestigious university in Japan. In Japan, the term 
“law school” had never been used in its usual context before the introduction of the new 
bar examination. So, all universities, including Keio, are new law schools. 
Nevertheless, many applicants who graduated from Keio University have passed the 
old bar exam. These students went to a preparatory school to learn the technique to 
4 
 
the bar examination4. The scandal cast much doubt on the fairness of the newly 
introduced bar examination (Asahi Newspaper 2007b, Enomoto 2007)5. In response to 
critics appealing to public opinion, the Ministry of Justice announced a compliance rule 
for the new bar examination committee (Ministry of Justice 2007b)6.  
The new bar examination was predicted to affect not only the market 
structure of the legal profession but also Japan‟s legal education system (Lawley 2005). 
As well, the unfairness resulting from the dishonesty of a professor would have been 
the result of the way of that JMCNE members were selected and the rise of 
competitive pressure, both being caused by institutional shortcomings. Thus it is 
important to assess the effects of the policies regarding the institutional changes made 
to the bar examination and the start-up of many new law schools. Although a number 
of reports focused on legal education reform and Japan‟s new law schools have been 
presented (e.g., Chan 2005, Foote 2005, Nishida 2005, Nottage 2005, Omura et al. 2005, 
Saegusa and Dierkes 2005, Steele 2005, Taylor 2005), there are few studies, that 
analyze the influence of the reforms from an economic view point7. Accordingly, this 
research uses the panel data of bar examinations covering the period 2006-2009 to find 
the determinants of the numbers of successful candidates from various law schools, 
and to ascertain the effects of the number of professors on the bar examination 
committee. I attempt to analyze the effects of criticism of undesired behavior and the 
announcement of compliance. To this end, I compare the estimation results between 
the 2006-2007and 2008-2009 periods.      
                                                                                                                                                     
pass the old bar exam. 
4 This professor was dismissed as a committee member and eventually resigned his 
position as a Keio professor (Nihon Keizai Newspaper 2007a). This is the first time 
that a member of the committee, for either the old or new bar, has been dismissed. 
5 This situation appears consistent with evidence from the United States of high 
stakes testing provided by Jacob and Levitt (2003). That is, that unexpected 
distortions such as cheating are induced depending on how the incentive systems are 
schemed, which is theoretically explained by general incentive theories, particularly 
the notion of multi-tasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).   
6 Recently, besides the case of the new bar examination, a growing number of 
undesired distortions stemming from competitive pressure on schools and teachers 
have been detected in Japan. For instance, since 2004 the Adachi ward in Tokyo has 
held a localized achievement test and then announced the results of each school; this 
resulted in a schoolmaster who oversaw a system of cheating to gain a higher score for 
their school (Nihon Keizai Newspaper 2007b, 2007c).  As well, an examination related 
to gaining a teacher‟s license was leaked with the aim of improving the pass rate 
(Asahi Newspaper 2007 a, Ichikawa 2007). Many high schools skipped teaching 
compulsory subjects that were not directly related to the university entrance 
examination (Ariyoshi et al. 2007).    
7 Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2007) investigated whether Japanese courts experienced 
problems related to recruiting and resignations after the political turmoil in 1993.  
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      The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II provides an overview of 
the bar examination reforms and gives a general background. Section III presents a 
simple econometric framework. The results of the estimations and discussion are 
provided in Section IV. The final section offers concluding observations and some policy 
implications.  
 
2. Overview of the bar examination reforms. 
 
2.1. Background of the new bar examination 
  It is well known that the number of judicial professionals such as judges, public 
prosecutors and attorneys has been scarce in Japan compared with other developed 
countries, mainly due to the strict regulation of the market for lawyers8 . Such 
regulation appears to have resulted in a great loss for the Japanese economy 
(Kinoshita 2000). The Justice System Reform Council (JSRC) was established by the 
government to study basic policies and programs with the aim of making the justice 
system more familiar and accessible to the general public9. In 2001, the Council issued 
an opinion paper calling for fundamental reforms; this represented a transition from 
“small-scale justice” to “large-scale justice” and sought to extend the rule of law to all of 
society. One specific issue of these judicial reforms was to realize a substantial 
augmentation of the number of people working in the legal profession. The policy 
would be relevant to the emergence of various new types of conflicts concerning 
commercial enterprises, medical treatment, construction work, and so on (Yamada 
2002)10.  
    Based on the 2001 opinion report, new law schools commenced operation from 
April 2004. In the old bar examination, candidates were usually law majors and had 
made plans to take the bar examination when they were undergraduates. However, in 
response to the latent demand for new legal services from many sectors of modern 
Japanese society, these new schools were designed to be open to graduates from any 
field, and welcomed those who were already working. This would enable individuals 
with backgrounds in business, government or other professions to develop more 
specialized legal careers based on their prior work experience. Most students took the 
                                                   
8 In 2001, the number of judicial professionals was 21,000 in Japan, while there were 
36,000 in France and Britain, whose populations are each about half that of Japan 
(The daily Yomiuri 2001).  
9 For more detail, see the web site of JFBA. 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/judicial_system.html 
10 In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion of foreign law firm operations in 
Japan, which has also increased the demand for new types of lawyers (Chan 2005). 
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three year standard course (Mishu Course). Students who possessed sufficient 
knowledge of the law were permitted to enter a special course (Kishu course) where the 
program could be completed in two years. Accordingly, applicants for the new law 
examination in 2006, the first to be held would be those who had completed the special 
course, meaning that the number of applicants for the 2006 examination was predicted 
to be small. That is to say, a full-scale new examination, which would include students 
from both the special and standard courses, would be held in 2007. The total numbers 
of successful applicants were 2087 and 1009, 1851, 2065, and 2043 in 2006, 2007, 2008 
and 2009, respectively. 
     The JSRC originally called on law school administrators to provide a legal 
education that would be comprehensive enough for about “70 to 80 %” of candidate 
students to pass the new bar examination (JSRC 2001). This anticipated pass rate was 
far higher than that of the previous law examination, approximately 2-3%, and 
therefore was expect to encourage university students to invest more effort to become 
judicial professionals. The JSRC set the objective of raising the number of applicants 
allowed to pass the new bar examination to 1,500 in 2004 and 3,000 by 2010, with the 
aim of achieving a total of approximately 50,000 judicial professionals by 2018 (JSRC 
2001). This implied that the total number of judicial professionals in 2018 would be 
more than twice that of 2001, which would result in a substantial increase in the net 
benefit to Japan11. In fact, once the new law school system was formally launched, 
most of Japan‟s major universities rushed to establish a law school, presumably 
because they felt that they could not maintain their previous status and might lose 
their prestigious social evaluation if they did not have a law school within the 
University (Yamada 2002, p.49). Consequently, more schools were established than 
had originally been expected. Prior to the 2006 examination, the JSRC announced that 
the anticipated pass rate in 2005 would be approximately 50 %, which was far smaller 
than that initially planned (Kakumu 2005). As anticipated, the pass rate in 2006 was 
48 % in 2006. However, the actual pass rates declined constantly; 40% (2007), 33% 
(2008) and 27% (2009). Contrary to anticipation, the situation has gradually been 
exacerbated12. 
     Prior to the establishment of the new law schools, applicants tended to rely 
greatly on a preparatory school system that specialized in “teaching to the test”, not on 
a university curriculum that would not be relevant to the „old‟ bar examination 
                                                   
11 Kinoshita (2002) indicated that net increase of the total benefit per year is about 
0.12-0.6 % of GDP if the civil service of the Japanese district courts were doubled. 
12 Kinoshita (2009) asserted that successful candidates should be increased under the 
previous bar examination system.  
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(Yamada 2002). The original plan for the new system aimed to decrease the influence of 
preparatory schools (Kakumu 2005). Whether applicants passed or failed the new bar 
examination would depend on the method of education and the guidance from lecturers 
at the law schools, in combination with the students‟ own efforts and ability, especially 
when the pass rate declined. The most important thing was for the schools to offer a 
quality education that would enable students to pass the examination. Hence, contrary 
to the original plan, professors would be more likely to shift away from non-tested 
areas or increased placement in special education, and end up, as before, merely 
“teaching to the test” (Jacob 2002). Inevitably, law schools turned out to be 
quasi-preparatory schools (Ishiwatari 2006). 
 
2.2. Results and committee of new bar examination 
  JMCNE Members responsible for setting and marking examinations are appointed 
by the Ministry of Justice. JMCNE members are to be selected from jurists such as 
public prosecutors, attorneys, and university professors, including those from the new 
law schools (Ministry of Justice 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008). Professors usually specialize 
in a specific area within their major subject. They also appear to favor this field when 
they teach students at law schools and when they set questions for the new bar 
examination. Such conditions ensure that questions tend to be closely related to the 
contents of these professor‟s lectures, even if they do not intend to “teach to the test”. 
As a consequence, students who are able to take lectures from JMCNE members have 
a great advantage when they come to take the examination. Furthermore, the system 
for selecting JMCNE members could be one reason that the new law school professors 
who were also JMCNE members were able to acquire accurate information about the 
examination prior to it being held. The unexpected competitive environment, as 
previously mentioned, seems to have increased the incentive for professors on the 
committee to put some emphasis in their lectures on particular areas scheduled to be 
in the examination. In fact, in addition to the Keio University Law School member of 
the committee who informed his students about the content of the new bar 
examination in 2007, some similar cases of JMCNE members unfairly giving special 
lectures at law schools have been reported (Asahi Newspaper 2007 e). Table 1 shows 
that 20-45% of JMCNE members are professors, indicating that the effects of JMCNE 
members on the results of the examination cannot be ignored. 
In more detail, the subjects of the new bar examination can be divided into 
compulsory common subjects and selective ones. All students must take the seven 
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compulsory common subjects and select one subject from among 8 electives13. Even in a 
law school employing a JMCNE member as a professor, some students study the 
elective subject that the JMCNE member professor taught, but other students study 
other elective subject. Hence, the advantage of employing JMCNE member professors 
of the elective subjects might be limited to the students who take the subject that the 
JMCNE member taught. On the other hand, all students can enjoy the benefits from 
studying common subjects if the JMCNE member is employed in the law school. 
Therefore, the JMCNE member specializing in compulsory common subjects is 
expected to have a greater effect on examination pass rates than a professor 
specializing in a selective subject.  
      Looking at Figure 1 reveals that the number of successful candidates is 
significantly larger in law schools that have a JMCNE member on their staff than 
those schools without such staff members. Table 2 shows that approximately 20 law 
schools had a JMCNE member on their staff, 50 did not. If students of law schools with 
a JMCNE member can obtain information concerning the contents of the bar 
examination, the new bar examination would naturally become unfair for students at 
law schools without JMCNE members.   
After the new bar examination held in May 2007, the Keio University 
Professor‟s leaking of the contents of the bar examination drew severe criticism. To 
subdue this criticism, the Ministry of Justice announced compliance rules for the new 
bar examination committee in September 2007. Under these rules; (1) JMCNE 
members should not give guidance to candidates for the new bar examination, and (2) 
JMCNE members should not refer to the contents of the new bar examination in the 
presence of others. In the next section, I examine whether the response of Ministry of 
Justice to the scandal and the resulting social pressure was an effective deterrent. 
   
3. Estimated model and interpretation of results.  
3.1. Data  
     The data set used in this study is from law school level panel data from 
2006 to 2009. Table 3 includes variable definitions, means and standard deviations. 
The dependent variable is the number of successful candidates 14 . The set of 
                                                   
13 7 compulsory common subjects comprise constitutional, administrative, commercial, 
civil, civil procedure, criminal and criminal procedure laws. The 8 elective subjects are 
taxation, labor, international, international private, economic, bankruptcy, 
environment and intellectual property laws. 
14 The data of 2006 is available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/h18-04kekka.pdf.  2007 at 
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independent variables is: Tuition fees collated from the Nikkei Career Magazine 
(various years); The number of professors on the JMCNE, divided into those 
specializing in compulsory common subjects and those in elective ones. Professors who 
are not JMCNE members. These data were obtained from the Ministry of Justice (2005, 
2006a, 2007, 2008) and the Nikkei Career Magazine (various years).  
      
3.2. Function form 
  Following from the discussion above, the estimated function of the number of 
successful candidates takes the following form: 
 
NSUCC it=0 +1COMit +2NOCOMit + 3TUITit + 4SCALit + εit            (1), 
where NSUCC represents the number of successful candidates of a law school i in year 
t, and ‟s represents the regression parameters. εit represents the error term. 
Estimates based on the OLS model of Eq. (1), however, may be biased if unobserved 
individual-level specific effects exist. For instance, the reputation and brand-name of a 
university seem to help attract good students, resulting in a large number of successful 
candidates. Furthermore, JMCNE members are thought to be selected from 
prestigious universities and hence the university‟s prestigious position appears to be 
positively correlated with the number of JMCNE members. For instance, The 
University of Tokyo is regarded as the most prestigious university in Japan (Nakazato 
et al., 2007).  During 2006-2009, the total number of JMCNE members selected from 
The University of Tokyo was 41, meaning 16% of the total number of JMCNE members 
selected from universities (Ministry of Justice, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008). It is thus 
necessary to control for such endogenous bias. εit can be rewritten as νi +ωit ,and Eq. 
(1 )then rewritten into: 
 
NSUCC it= β 0+ β 1COMit + β 1NOCOMit + 3TUITit + 4SCALit + νi +ωit            
(2), 
where νi represents the constant individual-level specific effects and ωit  is the 
standard error. To account for unobserved individual-level specific effects, the Fixed 
Effects model is employed. This model allows νi  to be correlated with the independent 
variables, and the constant individual-specific effects νi are differenced out (Woodridge, 
2002). That is, characteristics of a university such as the average level of its students 
                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/h19kekka01-6.pdf. 2008 at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/h20kekka01.html. 
2009 at http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/h21kekka01.html. 
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and its prestige status can be controlled for. Furthermore, even if νi, which captures 
these characteristics, is correlated with COM, the estimates of the Fixed Effects model 
will not be biased. As for COM (or CCOM and SCOM) and NOCOM, dependent and 
independent variables are evaluated at the sample means and therefore the coefficient 
values reported can be interpreted as elasticity15.  
COM represents the number of JMCNE members and is incorporated to 
capture the effect of JMCNE members on the numbers of successful candidates. COM 
is expected to take a positive sign if a JMCNE member makes a contribution to 
increase the number of successful candidates. For a closer examination, I divide COM 
into CCOM (JMCNE members teaching compulsory common subjects) and SCOM 
(JMCNE members teaching selective subjects). The anticipated signs of CCOM and 
SCOM are positive. Furthermore, as noted before, all candidates are obliged to take 
the compulsory common subjects, while they select just one subject from among 8 
selective ones. Inevitably, CCOM is expected to have a greater effect on the number of 
successful candidates than does SCOM. 
As control variables, I include TUIT and SCAL, standing for tuition and the 
number of students, respectively. Scarcity of information concerning education quality 
leads to an increase in demand for law schools with low tuition, which seems to affect 
the quality of students. To measure the scale of a law school, the number of students 
who entered the law school is considered better than the number of candidates who 
took the bar examination. This is because the number of candidates for the bar 
examination is restricted by the law school and so a selection bias occurs. There are 
students who cannot graduate from school after three years have passed since they 
entered the law school. Applicants who are not expected to pass the exam are 
instructed not to take the examination by professors, even if they have applied for the 
examination16.  
    
                                                   
15 See more details for Greene (Greene1997, p.280). 
  In the linear model, exy  '  the elasticity of y with respect to changes in x is 
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16 Number of applicants was 2125, 5401, 7842, and 9734, in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
respectively. Actually, however, correspondent number of candidates was 2087, 4607, 
6261, and 7392 (Ministry of Justice, 2006, 2007a, 2008, 2009).  
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4. Results. 
4.1. Interpretation of results 
Table 4 sets out the estimation results using data aggregated from 2006 to 
2009. For a closer examination, the estimation results of the periods 2006-2007 and 
2008-2009 are presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. In each Table, columns (1) and 
(2) present the results of OLS estimations and (3) and (4) provide the Fixed Effects 
estimations, respectively. 
Looking at Table 4 reveals that COM yields a significant positive sign in 
column (1), while it shows a positive sign it is not statistically significant in column (3). 
What is more, in column (2), the sign of CCOM is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 % level, whereas that of SCOM is negative. As shown in column (3), on the 
other hand, CCOM shows a positive sign but is not statistically significant, while that 
of SCOM continues to be negative. These results indicate that the effects of professors 
who are JMCNE members on the number of successful candidates disappeared when 
the Fixed Effects (unobservable features of a law school) are controlled for. 
    I now proceed to look at the results when the sample is divided into a 2006-2007 
sample and a 2008-2009 one. For the period 2006-2007, I see from Table 5 that COM 
shows positive signs and is statistically significant at the 1 % level, not only in column 
(1) but also in column(3). The value of the COM coefficient shown in column (1) is 2.84, 
smaller than the 4.86 in column (3). Hence, the effects of the number of professors who 
are JMCNE members on the numbers of successful candidates are thought to increase 
when Fixed Effects are controlled for. CCOM shows positive signs and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level, not only in column (2) but also in column (4). The value of 
the CCOM coefficient shown in column (2) is 4.09, smaller than the 4.40 in column (4). 
On the other hand, the signs of SCOM are negative and positive, in columns (2) and (4), 
respectively. Furthermore, those of SCOM are not statistically significant. Considering 
the results in Table 5 reveals that the positive effects of professors who are JMCNE 
members come from the JMCNE members who teach compulsory common subjects, not 
from those who teach selective subjects. These results are in line with the prediction. 
   With respect to Table 6, I observe that COM takes a significant positive sign in 
column (1) and that CCOM also takes a significant positive sign in column (2). 
However, the sign of COM becomes negative in column (3). The sign of CCOM 
continues to be positive but not statistically significant in column (4). SCOM produces 
a negative sign in columns (2) and (4), indicating that JMCNE members who teaches 
selective subjects do not have a role in increasing the numbers of successful candidates. 
It follows from what is observed in Table 6 that the positive effects of professors who 
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are JMCNE members disappear when Fixed Effects are controlled for.  
Combining the results of Tables 4, 5, and 6, it can be implied that the number 
of professors who are JMCNE members was considered to increase the number of 
successful candidates prior to the scandal about the Keio University professor in 2007. 
In this period, it is evident that the inclusion of JMCNE members teaching common 
subjects had a far larger effect than the inclusion of JMCNE members specializing in a 
selective subject. After the upsurge of public criticism and the announcement of the 
compliance rules, JMCNE members came to have no effect on the number of successful 
candidates.  
 
4.2. Discussion 
According to Dr Nishida, a professor at Okayama University Law School, 
which is part of a non-urban national university, the high numbers of law schools and 
students might result in graduates who cannot become legal professionals; thus he 
expects that at least one-third of the current law schools will close within the next ten 
years (Nishida 2005). As a matter of necessity, national law schools will be encouraged 
to improve their educational quality and systems to increase the number of their 
successful candidates since a law school‟s survival might depend upon their new bar 
examination pass rate. Eventually, not only private but also national law school 
professors will come to share similar opinions about improvements to the education 
system. The market for law school education will become competitive, resulting in an 
efficient outcome, even if this is contrary to the principle of law schools in which 
competitiveness of the previous bar examination should be mitigated and so the 
influence of preparatory schools should be reduced (Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology, 2004)17. Furthermore, this outcome is not considered 
to be undesirable from an economics point of view, and is a betrayal of trust in the 
fairness of the examination system.  
The true nature of the problem is that the method of selecting JMCNE 
members hinders law schools from competing fairly. It is appropriate to call on the 
Ministry of Justice to not appoint JMCNE members from the ranks of professors and 
to prohibit JMCNE members from lecturing in law schools. In accordance with this, a 
plan to reduce the number of professors appointed as JMCNE members was 
                                                   
17 On March 26, 2008, the Japan Law Foundation, one of the organs certifying and 
evaluating law schools, did not confirm Aichi University Law School as meeting its 
requirements; this was the first time for such a decision. This was mainly because this 
law school offered lectures that strongly focused on just the examination 
(http://www.jlf.or.jp/work/dai3sha/aichi_report2007.pdf).   
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announced (Asahi Newspaper 2007c). This scheme, however, has failed to be reflected 
in reality. As shown in Table 1, the ratio of professors to the total JMCNE members 
actually increased from 2007 to 2009 by approximately 20 %. 
Despite of increase in the rates of JMCNE members who are professors, the 
upsurge of criticism triggered by the scandal surrounding the Keio University 
professor in 2007 played an important role in preventing professors behaving 
undesirably, and thus made the examination competition more fair. Leakage of the 
contents of the bar examination might result in benefits if the leak made a contribution 
to increasing the number of successful candidates. On the other hand, a university‟s 
reputation might be harmed if the leak became known to the public, which can be 
considered a cost. The cost of a leak outweighs its benefit, thus discouraging a 
university from adopting such an unfair measure. This holds true especially when the 
likelihood that such actions would be revealed publicly is high.  
The system of including law school professors as JMCNE members has not 
been changed thus far. Hence, the essential problem regretfully continues to exist. 
According to Duggan and Levitt (2002), unfair behavior such as match rigging in 
“Sumo wrestling (a traditional fighting sport in Japan)” temporarily disappears in 
times of increased media scrutiny and criticism. Nevertheless, as time passes, match 
rigging reemerges. The increase in competition among law schools is thought to raise 
the incentive for professors to undertake patterns of unfair behavior. That is, not only 
the benefits stemming from a competitive mechanism but also the fairness of the 
examination itself will be sacrificed unless citizens and the mass media keep an eye 
open for undesirable behavior by law school professors. Thus, it is necessary for 
citizens and the media to pay attention not only to the number of successful candidates 
but also to the fairness of the examination competition to maintain the element of 
fairness in the bar examination. 
 
5. Concluding remarks.  
      
     The inauguration of a new bar examination was designed to bring about benefits 
to modern Japanese society by providing for greater numbers of lawyers with their 
specialized legal careers based on a wider range of backgrounds than before its 
introduction. This was in response to the highly specialized and complicated 
circumstances that then existed in Japan, and to the effects of moves towards 
globalization. New law schools were anticipated to focus on legal qualification through 
a „process‟ of legal education; therefore, differing from the previous system, which in 
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effect only evaluated applicants‟ skill at passing the examination. Nevertheless, a 
situation contrary to the original purpose of the new system came about soon after its 
introduction. A proliferation of new law schools increased the competitive pressure on 
professors to raise their law school‟s pass rate to enable the law school to survive, 
resulting in professors having an incentive to cheat. Consequently, a scandal occurred 
in 2007 in which a professor gave his students prepared answers and explained points 
similar to those he knew would appear in the examination. I considered that such a 
scandal was caused by the shortcomings of the new system; therefore, I attempted to 
investigate how and to what extent the new system hampered the establishment of 
marketplace desired for the new law schools.  
After controlling for unobservable universities‟ specific effects using a Fixed 
Effects model, this paper concluded as follows:  
(1) From 2006 to 2007, the number of professors serving as JMCNE members affected 
the number of successful candidates. Furthermore, JMCNE members specializing in 
teaching the compulsory common subjects had a significant effect, but those teaching 
elective subjects had no effect.  
(2) From 2008 to 2009, no type of JMCNE member influenced the number of successful 
candidates.  
Considering the estimation results together, I feel it appropriate to remark 
that universities with a JMCNE member enjoyed the benefits since that professor 
could take advantage of their information about the examination when from 2006 to 
2007 there was an incentive to „teach to the test‟. The reason such an undesirable 
outcome could occur is that professors who were JMCNE members were encouraged to 
cheat by the strong competitive pressure compared with the system governing the 
previous bar examination. This mechanism is tied to the claim that high-powered 
incentive schemes are likely to induce behavior distortions (Jacob and Levitt, 2003). 
The fact that a professor who was a JMCNE member informed his students of the 
contents of the new bar examination in 2007 caused a scandal that triggered harsh 
criticism about the fairness of the newly introduced examination. The situation since 
that event has changed drastically. The existence of professors who are JMCNE 
members does not now influence the results of the examination.  
The compliance rules promulgated by the Ministry of Justice regarding the 
new bar examination have little legal force and little sanction power; thus they have 
only a minor role in deterring professors who are JMCNE members from engaging in 
prohibited behavior. To make the market function well, and to prevent professors from 
cheating, as well as to bring back fairness to the new bar examination, the Ministry of 
15 
 
Justice should not appoint professors from law schools as JMCNE members. If it is 
difficult to change the system, the news media should be vigilant about the conditions 
surrounding bar examination, not least with an aim to continue to put those involved 
in law school under social pressure arising from public opinion.  
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TABLE 1 
Ratio of professors of committee members (%) 
 Common subject Selective subject Total 
2006     30.9      25.0 28.0 
2007 20.5 25.0    21.7 
2008 28.2 37.5    31.3 
2009 46.1 38.0    43.3 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
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TABLE 2 
          Number of universities with committee members and without it. 
 
 Committee Non-committee 
2006 17 57 
2007 24 50 
2008 17 57 
2009 20 54 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). Nikkei Career Magazine (2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009). 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
NSUCC Number of successful candidates to enrollment 
entering law school three years ago (%). 
25.4 38.6 
COM Number of professors of committee members  
 
0.85 2.01 
CCOM 
 
Number of professors of committee members of 
compulsory common subjects  
0.63 1.46 
SCOM Number of professors of committee members of 
selective common subjects  
0.22 0.64 
NOCOM Number of professors of non-committee member 
 
21.8 11.1 
TUIT Tuition (Thousands Yens) 
 
1142 316 
SCAL 
 
Number of students (Number of students who 
entered the law school three years ago) 
66.4 56.6 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of number of successful candidates (All years) 
Variables (1)OLS 
 
(2)OLS 
 
(3)FIXED 
 
(4)FIXED 
 
COM 2.65** 
(4.72) 
 0.21 
(0.22) 
 
CCOM 
 
 3.29** 
(3.02) 
 0.27 
(0.37) 
SCOM  -0.20 
(-0.34) 
 -0.08 
(-0.22) 
NOCOM 4.49 
(0.94) 
4.87 
(0.99) 
9.05 
(0.92) 
9.25 
(0.93) 
TUIT -0.11** 
(-3.55) 
-0.10** 
(-3.59) 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
-0.07** 
(-1.60) 
SCAL 
 
0.44** 
(11.2) 
0.42** 
(11.2) 
0.27** 
(2.62) 
0.27** 
(2.60) 
R-square 0.87 
 
0.87 
 
0.52 0.52 
Number of 
groups 
  74 74 
Number of 
Observations 
 257 257 257 257 
Notes:  Values of COM, CCOM, SCOM and NOCOM are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is calculated by 
delta method. Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively. 
Constant is included in OLS estimations. Year dummies are included in all estimations. 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of number of successful candidates (2006 & 2007) 
Variables (1)OLS 
 
(2)OLS 
 
(3)FIXED 
 
(4)FIXED 
 
COM 2.84** 
(3.95) 
 4.86** 
(4.60) 
 
CCOM 
 
 4.09** 
(3.67) 
 4.40** 
(4.60) 
SCOM  -0.54 
(-1.40) 
 0.32 
(0.65) 
NOCOM -0.14 
(-0.07) 
0.21 
(0.10) 
10.4 
(1.58) 
11.1 
(1.57) 
TUIT -0.10** 
(-4.09) 
-0.09** 
(-3.59) 
0.29 
(0.17) 
0.29 
(0.17) 
SCAL 
 
0.44** 
(14.3) 
0.41** 
(12.6) 
0.26** 
(6.61) 
0.26** 
(6.27) 
R-square 0.92 
 
0.92 
 
0.87 0.87 
Number of 
groups 
  74 74 
Number of 
Observations 
 119 119 119 119 
Notes:  Values of COM, CCOM, SCOM and NOCOM are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is calculated by 
delta method. Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively. 
Constant is included in OLS estimations. Year dummies are included in all estimations. 
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TABLE 6 
Determinants of number of successful candidates (2008 & 2009) 
 
Variables (1)OLS 
 
(2)OLS 
 
(3)FIXED 
 
(4)FIXED 
 
COM 3.44** 
(4.46) 
 -2.53 
(-1.66) 
 
CCOM 
 
 5.01** 
(2.61) 
 0.31 
(0.20) 
SCOM  -0.61 
(-0.69) 
 -2.75** 
(-2.43) 
NOCOM 14.2 
(1.21) 
15.1 
(1.47) 
-8.96 
(-0.34) 
-11.3 
(-0.51) 
TUIT -0.09 
(-1.56) 
-0.07 
(-1.38) 
0.07** 
(2.73) 
0.09** 
(3.79) 
SCAL 
 
0.36** 
(3.47) 
0.31** 
(3.12) 
-0.27* 
(-2.26) 
-0.31** 
(-3.10) 
R-square 0.86 
 
0.87 
 
0.25 0.33 
Number of 
groups 
  74 74 
Number of 
Observations 
 138 138 138 138 
Notes:  Values of COM, CCOM, SCOM and NOCOM are elasticity is evaluated at the sample means and its t-statistics is calculated by 
delta method. Numbers in parentheses are t-value.  ** and * means statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% level, respectively. 
Constant is included in OLS estimations. Year dummies are included in all estimations. 
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FIGURE 1 
Average Number of Successful Candidates of University with committee Member and without Committee Members   
 
 
